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Preliminary evaluation of a new tool to aid judgements of credibility in the medico-legal 
setting 
Abstract  
Purpose.  Clinical psychologists and other health professionals are often requested to act as 
expert witnesses in Court. They are required to assess, and report upon, the reliability of the 
accounts of physical and psychological symptoms made by their clients. This study 
investigated the effectiveness of a checklist drawing upon relevant literature on lying and 
malingering to aid the detection of exaggeration of physical symptoms. 
Method. Sixty-four participants were cast as interviewers and assigned to either a ‘checklist’ or 
‘no checklist’ condition.  Another 64 volunteers were assigned to either a ‘truth teller’ or 
‘malingerer’ role and, after undergoing a cold pressor procedure, were interviewed about their 
experience. The interviewers with a checklist drawn from the literature were asked to rate the 
presence of 28 checklist items on 5-point Likert scales and to indicate whether or not they 
believed their interviewee was truthful or exaggerating his/her symptoms.  The interviewers 
without the checklist were asked to simply indicate whether their interviewee was truthful or 
exaggerating.  
Results. Evaluators who were not given the checklist did not classify their interviewees at a 
level significantly better than chance.  Those using the checklist achieved an overall hit rate of 
70%. Signal detection analysis supported the finding that those with the checklist showed 
greater discriminability.  Nine checklist items significantly discriminated between truth tellers 
and malingerers. Furthermore the total checklist score was significantly higher for exaggerated 
accounts than for truthful accounts.  
Conclusions. Results suggest that a checklist based on the literatures into lying and 
malingering warrants further investigation. Such a tool would be useful as an aid for expert 
witnesses called to provide informed opinion on the likelihood that a claimant is exaggerating, 
malingering or otherwise misrepresenting difficulties. 
 
Keywords: deception, credibility, medico-legal reports, expert witnesses, malingering 
 




Preliminary evaluation of a new tool to aid judgements of credibility in the medico-legal 
setting 
  Clinical psychologists, orthopaedic consultants and other health care professionals can 
be instructed to assist a Court by providing, in the role of an expert witness, a detailed report 
on matters such as the cause and course of someone’s distress or difficulty after an accident. 
Expert witnesses are required, when submitting reports in the medico-legal context, to confirm 
that the opinion they provide “can be expressed finally and without qualification” (Practice 
Direction supplement CPR Part 35 for Experts and Assessors, UK, 2010, p.10). The process by 
which an expert might reach such a position of satisfaction is, however, not clear. Experts 
preparing a medico-legal report will draw upon their professional expertise, providing 
references to the academic literature as appropriate. However, while experts may be more or 
less familiar with the academic literature pertaining to the assessment of malingering (e.g. 
Drob, Meehan & Waxman, 2009; Hall & Hall, 2006; Kramer & Gagliardi, 2009; Resnick, 1995; 
Rogers, 1997; 2008), fewer may be familiar with theory and research relating to lying in an 
investigative interview setting. 
  The established psychological literature on ‘lying’ relates to the evaluation of an 
individual's presentation at interview, and can inform interviewers as they consider the validity 
of someone’s reported experiences (e.g. Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, Brown & Mann, 2006; Vrij, 
Granhag & Porter, 2010).  While a number of credibility assessment tools have been 
investigated for the forensic setting, it is proposed here that the underlying principles could 
serve as the basis for development of a checklist, including informative behavioural cues, to be 
used by health professionals undertaking assessment through face-to-face interviews for 
medico-legal reports.  
Tools for the detection of lying 
  Bond and DePaulo (2006) and Vrij (2008), in comprehensive reviews, concluded that 
lay persons are able to accurately differentiate between liars and truth tellers between 45% and 
60% of the time (where 50% can be expected by chance alone). The evidence suggests that, in 
the first instance, the process of detection itself appears to be a difficult task (Vrij, 2008), and 
studies have indicated that professional interviewers such as police officers, social workers, 
and customs officials tend to share the same inaccurate beliefs about how body language 
changes when people lie (Vrij, Akehurst & Knight, 2006; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 




2004a; Vrij, Edward & Bull, 2001). It is assumed here that physicians, clinical psychologists 
and others conducting medico-legal assessments for the Courts are unlikely to be any better 
able to accurately differentiate between liars and truth tellers because of these false beliefs held 
about nonverbal cues of deceit.   
  Both verbal and nonverbal behavioural cues can be used to make veracity decisions. 
However, in the medico-legal setting, a focus on language seems more feasible as nonverbal 
behaviours can be difficult to detect in real time for those without training (Vrij, 2008, Porter, 
ten Brinke & Wallace, 2012).  As such, no nonverbal cues were included in the checklist under 
investigation. There are a limited number of paralinguistic cues that have been found to 
successfully discriminate between truth tellers and liars.  As these cues are easier to perceive 
for an interviewer (e.g. length of pauses and time taken to answer a question (response 
latency)) they were included in the checklist (see Appendix 1). Pauses and response latencies 
are expected to be longer for liars compared to truth tellers as liars need to think for longer 
before giving and during their answers (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008 for reviews). 
  The difficulties facing an expert as they endeavour to detect dishonesty via nonverbal 
cues has led investigators to explore the possibility that what is said might more reliably serve 
to identify attempted deception. Statement Validity Assessment (SVA) is a tool for judging the 
credibility of statements based on the content of what an interviewee says. SVA incorporates 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), which comprises a list of criteria identified as being 
more frequently included in truthful accounts of actual events (Steller & Köhnken, 1989).  It 
has been proposed that CBCA fosters a more systematic assessment of the veracity of 
statements by directing the interviewer’s attention to specific aspects of someone’s description 
of an event or experience. Blandón-Gitlin, Pezdek, Lindsay and Hagen (2009) have suggested 
that “Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is the most widely used veracity assessment 
technique for discriminating between accounts of true and fabricated events” (p. 901).  
The 19 criteria used in CBCA are organized into four categories (see Table 1). The first 
category identifies what are described as ‘general characteristics’, and draws upon the premise 
that an account of an event that someone has actually experienced will tend to be logical and 
coherent (Criterion 1), include some digressions or shifts in focus (Criterion 2), and contain a 
substantial amount of detail (Criterion 3). The second and third categories draw the 
interviewers attention to the specific contents of the statement (Criteria 4–13) and to 
motivation-related contents (Criteria 14–18), wherein it is assumed that, for example, a truthful 




interviewee will be more likely to report accurately the content of speech or conversations 
(Criterion 6), and would be more likely to express doubt about his or her own memory of 
events (Criterion 15). The final category concerns details characteristic of a particular crime 
that a lay person may question but an expert might recognise as a detail commonly included in 
the truthful accounts of witnesses to that particular crime. If a substantial number of criteria are 
present, then CBCA predicts that it is more likely that an account will be truthful. CBCA 
draws substantially on the assumptions that lying is cognitively more demanding than truth- 
telling, and that those who lie will be more actively concerned with the impression they are 
making on interviewers than will truth tellers.  
  Given that CBCA was not developed for the medico-legal setting some criteria are 
more directly relevant than others.  For example, the criteria 'description of interactions' and 
‘reproduction of conversation’ are not relevant for the reporting of symptoms, they require the 
recall of a particular event. However, the criterion ‘unstructured production’ refers to the 
degree to which an interviewee scatters information throughout their description (rather than 
presenting details in a structured, coherent and chronological order) and may well be present in 
a truthful account of symptoms and therefore relevant to the medico-legal setting. 
Furthermore, criteria such as ‘superfluous details’ may helpfully draw the medico-legal 
assessor’s attention to consideration of whether an individual's description of an accident or 
illness includes information that is not essentially relevant.  Taking relevance for the medico-
legal setting (the reporting of symptoms rather than an event/crime) into account, ten of the 
CBCA criteria were included in the checklist under investigation (see Table 1 and Appendix 
1).  Illustrative examples of each CBCA criterion, relating to the medico-legal setting, were 
included in the checklist to provide extra clarity for evaluators. 
  Statement Validity Assessment also identifies, in its Validity Checklist (see Table 2), 
other aspects which may be useful for an interviewer to consider in the medico-legal setting. 
Furthermore, attention to these elements of the interview can offer a basis for evaluation of the 
quality of the interview itself (Steller & Köhnken, 1989). A poor interview may lead to 
misinterpretation of an interviewee’s behaviour and their presentation of information. The fact 
that interviewees may have presented their ‘story’ repeatedly, and/or may feel annoyed by the 
impersonal approach of an ‘expert’ can lead to presentation and behaviour at interview that 
might easily be misconstrued (e.g. an abrupt interviewee manner and rushed answers may be 
erroneously considered deceptive). Just as the CBCA criteria may require revision or 




adaptation for the medico-legal context, so might the elements of the Validity Checklist of 
SVA.  
  The Validity Checklist items are intended to assist interviewers by reminding them to 
consider some key issues within the context of the interview setting. Truthful individuals in 
compensation settings may be anxious, fearing inappropriate disbelief by interviewers, or 
rejection of valid information by interviewers, and some will experience anxiety in the 
presence of what they perceive to be authority figures. Errors made in the interviewee’s 
reporting of facts may be associated with the extended duration of the litigation process, 
wherein someone may genuinely be unable to accurately recall detailed information about 
events which may have occurred five years or more ago.  As such, the Validity Checklist items 
provide a potentially useful list to help interviewers explicitly assess all such aspects more 
consistently.  That said, in a lab-based, medico-legal setting many of these items are not 
applicable.  For the checklist used in this study two items were used (see Table 2 and 
Appendix 1). 
   Another potentially useful assessment tool, Reality Monitoring (RM) has been 
proposed as an aid to the examination of the quality and credibility of information provided in a 
statement (Johnson & Raye, 1981). RM draws upon the premise that memory characteristics of 
experienced events differ qualitatively and quantitatively from characteristics of fabricated 
events. It is suggested that memories originating from real experience are more likely to 
include perceptual information (visual details, sounds, smells, tastes and physical feelings 
related to the event), contextual information (information regarding when and where the event 
happened), and affective information (details about emotional reactions to the event), than 
accounts based on fabrication. RM suggests that fabricated accounts would involve more 
information requiring cognitive operations, such as details about thoughts, reasoning, and 
inferences of events (e.g. “I must have had my coat on as it was very cold that night”) than 
truthful accounts (see Table 3). Masip, Sporer, Garrido and Herrero (2005), in a review of the 
evidence relating to RM, suggested that empirical results were relatively poor, noting 
contradictory findings, which they associated potentially with differences in the 
operationalization and procedures used in various studies. In conclusion, however, they 
suggested that RM did tend to discriminate above chance level.  Vrij (2008) reports, in a 
review of 10 studies that looked at the effectiveness of RM, an average accuracy rate for truths 
of  71.7% and for lies of 66.1% (with 68.8% for truths and lies combined).  Vrij (2008) 




suggests that RM criteria might complement CBCA criteria in that the latter takes cognitive 
and motivational factors into account whereas the former has a more theoretical basis in 
memory research. Indeed, three studies (Sporer, 1997; Strömwall, Bengtsson, Leander & 
Granhag, 2004; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004b) found that the combined accuracy of 
RM and CBCA criteria was higher than for the CBCA criteria alone.  
Again, taking relevance for the medico-legal setting (the reporting of symptoms rather 
than an event/crime) into account, five of the RM criteria were included in the checklist for the 
current study and, as for the CBCA criteria, relevant illustrative examples were given for each 
item (see Table 3 and Appendix 1).  
  
The detection of malingering 
  The academic literature on lying has largely been based on the examination of active, 
deliberate and clear cut lying in a laboratory setting – when what is said is wholly true or 
wholly untrue. In medico-legal settings, however, the detection of partial truth is more likely to 
be of relevance. When endeavouring to deceive an assessor in relation to their experience of 
ill-health, pain or restriction, a claimant in the litigation setting might invent some symptoms, 
exaggerate others, and/or blame a pre-existing ailment on the accident under consideration. 
Thus, Resnick (1995) distinguished between: pure malingering (feigning non-existent disease); 
partial malingering (exaggeration of existing symptoms); and false imputation (falsely 
ascribing real symptoms to unrelated cause). 
  Resnick (1997) identified a number of aspects that should be considered by the 
interviewer as he seeks to evaluate the validity of claims made at interview. These included 
motivation to exaggerate, irregular employment and job dissatisfaction, previous claims for 
injuries, and psychological test results.  It was not possible to include these items in the 
checklist for the current study due to the laboratory-based nature of the experiment. However 
Resnick (1997) also suggested that a  lack of co-operation at interview and falsely ascribing 
real symptoms to fabricated event (e.g. suggesting that an already aching neck and back are 
due to whiplash after a car accident) could be indicators of deception.  These two criteria were 
used in the current checklist (see Appendix 1). However, the issues identified by Resnick 
(1997) also underline the need within the medico-legal setting to consider the possibility that 
deception in some circumstances will not necessarily be the product of deliberate and 
conscious motivation. The possibility that someone may receive large sums in compensation if 




their symptoms and difficulties persist may distort and prolong their experience of those 
difficulties through the very process of being repeatedly asked about the problems. The 
relevance of awareness of the broader context was emphasised by Ferrari, Kwan, Russell, 
Pearce and Schrader (1999), who suggested that prognoses in medico-legal settings can be 
substantially affected by a range of other aspects, including: blame, expectations, labelling and 
social factors.  From these aspects three items were included in the current checklist; blaming 
others and believing others behaved recklessly (as indicators of lying) and an expectation that 
the symptoms may only last a short time or show significant improvement (as an indicator of 
truthfulness) (see Appendix 1). 
  Rogers (1997) suggested that a medico-legal assessor might usefully explore the nature 
and pattern of reporting of symptoms and difficulties at interview. Rogers (1997) suggests the 
assessor should pay particular attention to the prevalence of: indiscriminate symptom 
endorsement (confirming presence of all symptoms asked about); improbable symptoms 
(unlikely difficulties in the context); presence of improbable combinations of symptoms (e.g. 
contradictory patterns of symptoms); and presence of symptoms of improbably extreme 
severity. These factors make up the final four checklist items, all indicators of lying, for the 
current investigation (see Appendix 1).  
Interviewing and the medico-legal expert  
   The literature on detecting lying indicates that expert witnesses in the medico-legal 
setting could make their task easier if they encourage their clients to talk.  The structured 
evaluation of material using SVA and RM also serves to add confidence to the conclusions 
reached. The absence of such a structured approach in most medico-legal settings may reduce 
reliability of the opinion expressed, and so lead a Court to feel less confident about the 
conclusions reached. It could therefore be the case that a structured process could help experts 
elicit, attend to, and then assess the aspects of an interview that will help them support the 
level of confidence they place in their opinions. An aide-memoire might be helpful, and reduce 
the expert’s cognitive load. More importantly, perhaps, it might also be that a more structured 
approach will offer the objective advantages potentially associated with CBCA, thereby 
improving the assessor’s ability to identify lying and malingering. 
  This approach however differs from other established methods such as the Structured 
Interview of Reported Symptoms – 2nd Edition (SIRS-2; Rogers, Sewell & Gillard, 2010) and 




the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-Fast; Miller, 2001, 2004). It has been 
suggested that undue reliance on such devices may be criticised in the medico-legal setting 
(Frederick, 2012).   The original SIRS, (Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) used eight scales in 
relation to the assessment of individuals as honest or feigning, and five scales in relation to 
response styles. Scales included those entitled: Rare Symptoms, Symptom Combinations, 
Improbable and Absurd Symptoms, Blatant Symptoms, Subtle Symptoms, Selectivity of 
Symptoms, Severity of Symptoms and Reported vs. Observed Symptoms. The M-Fast (Miller, 
2001) was based on strategies identified by Rogers (1997), and used themed scales to address 
aspects such as unusual hallucinations, extreme symptomatology, rare combination, negative 
image and suggestibility (Miller, 2004).  
  However in the UK medico-legal setting such devices are rarely used, perhaps because 
the relatively extreme symptoms would appear, on the basis of the authors’ experience, less 
relevant to the more typical range of difficulties encountered and reported.  Whilst there is 
overlap with some of the aspects previously mentioned, the SIRS- 2 and M-Fast approach is 
distinct from that of the aide-memoire style of checklist envisaged by the current authors, the 
preference for the latter springing from criticisms of the reliability and validity of such devices 
in the medico-legal setting (Faust, 2012). 
Development of a checklist for use by medico-legal experts 
  In summary, for the current investigation, a broad selection of possible verbal cues to 
lying/malingering and truth-telling was collated (based on the literature and techniques 
outlined above).  Aspects deemed inappropriate to the medico-legal setting were excluded. 
Where appropriate, items listed in the investigative interviewing literature were rephrased to 
make them relevant to the medico-legal setting (see Appendix 1). A list of 28 criteria thereby 
emerged. On considering how the presence of each criterion might be assessed at interview, a 
graded approach, rather than an ‘all-or-nothing’ assessment was selected, noting that the 
interviewer’s opinion will tend to be subjective rather than objective. The resulting checklist 
tool was evaluated in terms of its usefulness in discriminating truthful interviewees from those 
who were malingering. It was hypothesised that interviewers given the checklist tool would be 
better able to discriminate between truthful and exaggerated accounts of physical symptoms 
than those not given the checklist (Hypothesis 1). It was further hypothesised that the total 
checklist score would be significantly higher for exaggerated compared to truthful accounts 
(Hypothesis 2) and the 28 checklist items would significantly discriminate between truthful 




and exaggerated accounts in the directions specified above (Hypothesis 3).  Although the 
literature suggests that the 28 checklist items should discriminate between truth and 
exaggeration, the authors were interested to see which items most influenced interviewers 
when they made their judgements.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via advertisements to students and staff at a University in 
the UK. A small payment was made to each attendee. 128 participants took part in the 
investigation, 64 in the role of interviewer and 64 in the role of interviewee. Of the 64 
interviewers, 32 (14 males and 18 females) were given a checklist to help them assess 
credibility, these participants ages ranged from 18 years to 54 years (M = 22.69 years, SD = 
8.14 years). The other 32 interviewers (11 males and 21 females) were not given a checklist, 
their ages ranged from 18 years to 47 years (M = 22.56 years, SD = 6.08 years).  Of the 
interviewees, 32 (8 males and 24 females) were asked to tell the truth about their symptoms 
following a cold pressor procedure, their ages ranged from 18 years to 38 years (M = 21.97 
years, SD = 4.23 years), and 32 (15 males and 17 females) were asked to exaggerate their 
symptoms when asked at interview, their ages ranged from 19 years to 61 years (M = 26.03 
years, SD = 9.71 years). 
Design 
  After undergoing a cold pressor procedure truth tellers and malingerers were 
interviewed about their experience.  They each took part in two interviews, telling the truth 
both times or exaggerating both times.  All interviewers were given the same interview 
protocol. The interviewers with the checklist were asked to rate the presence of 28 checklist 
items on 5-point Likert scales ranging from [1] absent to [5] strongly present indicating 
whether or not they believed their interviewee was truthful or exaggerating his/her symptoms.  
The interviewers without the checklist were asked to simply indicate whether their interviewee 
was truthful or exaggerating. All interviewers were additionally asked to rate their confidence 
in their judgement.  
 
 





  The checklist.  A checklist was developed in which a higher score indicated greater 
likelihood or risk of lying and/or malingering. The items included in the checklist were taken 
from some 49 items generated from the relevant literatures. These included all 19 CBCA 
criteria and all 11 Validity Checklist items from SVA (see Steller & Köhnken, 1989 and 
Tables 1 and 2), all 8 RM criteria (see Vrij, 2008 and Table 3), 2 paralinguistic cues that had 
been reported in the literature to discriminate between truth tellers and liars (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008) and the items outlined in the malingering literature (2 from Resnick, 1997;  3 
from Ferrari et al., 1999; 4 from Rogers, 1997). The researchers reviewed the identified items, 
drawing upon experience of working as an expert witness and 21 items were excluded because 
they were not relevant to the medico-legal setting or were not relevant to the lab setting (see 
Tables 1,2 and 3). Thus, assessors were asked to consider 28 items. 
For each question the participants were asked, “Please circle the number that best 
reflects your view”. There was a scale for each question where, dependent on whether the 
literature suggested the item should appear more often in truthful or exaggerated accounts, 
sometimes 1= not at all present and 5 =very much present and for other items 1 = very much 
present and 5 = not at all present. In short, the higher the score for each item the more likely it 
was that the interviewee was exaggerating.  For example, the literature suggests that if an 
interviewee blames someone else or considers the other party was reckless they are more likely 
to be lying/exaggerating so for this item the scale ran from 1 = not at all present to 5 = very 
much present.  Conversely, research suggests that the CBCA criteria are more likely to be 
present in truthful accounts so for these items (e.g. unusual details, reproduction of 
conversation, quantity of detail)  the scale ran from 5 = not at all present to 1 = very much 
present. The interviewers were asked to add up their 28 item scores to give a total and were 
instructed that the higher the total for the checklist, the more likely that their interviewee was 
exaggerating his/her symptoms. The full checklist can be seen in Appendix 1, which also 
identifies the source of selected items.  
Procedure 
  Participants were recruited in groups of four.  Two were assigned to the role of 
interviewer and two to the role of interviewee.  All interviewees were asked to take part in a 
cold pressor procedure that would constitute the event that they would later be interviewed 




about.  One interviewee in each group was assigned to be a truth teller, the other a malingerer. 
Each interviewer conducted two interviews, one with the truth teller and one with the 
malingerer in his group.  However, interviewers were told that it was equally likely that they 
could see any combination of truth tellers or malingerers (i.e. two truth tellers, two malingerers 
or one of each). The order in which truth tellers and malingerers were presented to interviewers 
was counterbalanced. 
Cold pressor procedure. A cold pressor apparatus was used consisting of an insulated 
container, measuring 30 x 40 x 30 cm. The entire container was filled with water and ice and 
was equipped with a moveable armrest used to immerse each participant’s arm. Water 




C.  Those undertaking the cold pressor procedure were 
asked to read and complete a medical risk questionnaire, provide biographical details, and 
then, if no concerns emerged, complete an informed consent form.  A heart rate monitor was 
fitted and monitored throughout the cold pressor task as part of the recommended risk 
management procedure. Participants were assured that the procedure would not result in 
physical injury.  There were no cases of participant withdrawal. Participants were instructed to 
place their arm on the moveable armrest of the cold pressor apparatus, to lower their arm into 
the ice water, and to keep their arm immersed for as long as they felt they could tolerate with a 
maximum period of immersion of 3 minutes.  If participants lasted for 3 minutes they were 
instructed by the experimenter to remove their arm
1
. All participants were asked to complete 
the Short Form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ; Melzack,1987), once in relation to level 
of discomfort during the ice plunge and a second time in relation to discomfort following 
removal of their hand from the water. That is, they were asked to rate, on 4-point scales (0 = 
none, 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe) throbbing, shooting, stabbing, sharpness, cramping, 
gnawing, burning, aching, heaviness, tenderness, splitting, tiring, sickening, fearfulness and 
punishing in terms of their severity. They were then given directions to tell the truth or 
exaggerate their experience to those interviewing them.  
Truth tellers.  Those in the truth-telling condition were told to “Tell the truth about your 
experience.  Try to include lots of truthful detail about your physical and psychological 
symptoms to make a really credible impression.  You might imagine that, should the 
interviewer believe you, you would be awarded monetary compensation”. The participants 
were then given 5 minutes to prepare their accounts.  
                                                          
1
 Participants kept their arms in the cold water for between 64 and 180 seconds (M  = 115 seconds, SD  = 6.04 
seconds). 




Malingerers.  Malingerers were given the following instruction, “We would like you to 
convince the interviewer that the discomfort you experienced was worse than it actually was. 
You are also asked to pretend that the symptoms are ongoing and substantial.  Try to include 
lots of detail about your physical and psychological symptoms to make a really credible 
impression. You might imagine that, should the interviewer believe you, you would be 
awarded monetary compensation”. These participants were then given a list of symptoms for 
consideration when preparing to exaggerate symptoms
2
. They were given 5 minutes to prepare 
their accounts.  
  Each interview was video-taped, unless participants declined to be filmed. After their 
interviews, each ice-plunge participant was asked to respond on a 7-point scale to a number of 
questions about their experience of the interviews (see Results section). 
Interviewers.  Those assigned to be interviewers were split into two groups, only one of which 
used the specialist checklist.  
  All interviewers were given the following instructions: “Our interviewees have 
undergone a cold pressor procedure which involves them holding their forearm and hand in 
very cold water. We have asked some people to exaggerate the discomfort they have 
experienced, while others will be simply telling the truth. We want you to decide whether your 
interviewee is telling the truth or exaggerating.  Here are some interview questions that you 
can use to help you”.   
  The interviewers who were given the checklist were also told: “Here also is a checklist 
that the research team have devised.  This checklist is made up of many criteria which are 
thought to be indicators of truthfulness or lying.  Before you make your final credibility 
judgement, work through this checklist and keep your responses in mind when you make your 
final decision about your interviewee.  Ring a number for each item and then add up to get a 
total score.  The higher the total score the more likely that your interviewee is exaggerating”.   
   All interviewers were provided with a protocol for the interview as follows:  
                                                          
2
 Truth tellers and malingerers were treated differently to mimic real life. A list of symptoms was provided to 
malingerers to replicate the preparation that it is likely that those in real life would undertake before attending a 
meeting during which they intend to lie about their symptoms. Those malingering may resort to websites and 
other medical literature to help them to concoct a plausible account of non-existent or exaggerated symptoms. 
Truth tellers, on the other hand, tend to believe in the illusion of transparency i.e. that the truth will ‘shine 
through’ and so will simply be confident to report their true symptoms with little preparation pre-interview.   




“Please could you tell me everything you can about that experience, even little things that you 
do not think are important? Can you tell me about the symptoms that you experienced whilst 
you had your hand in the cold water? Can you tell me about the symptoms you experienced 
once you had taken your hand out of the cold water? Are you still experiencing any 
symptoms? If yes, could you tell me about the symptoms that you are still experiencing? Now 
in your own words please just tell me once again about your experience of putting your hand in 
the ice water and any subsequent discomfort up to the time of this interview.  Please include as 
much detail as you can.” 
  After each interview, interviewers were asked to complete a questionnaire about their 
impressions of the interviewees. Before completing the questionnaire, those in the checklist 
condition worked through each of the 28 items and calculated a total checklist score (see 
Materials section above).  The questionnaire required that interviewers indicated whether or 
not they thought their interviewee was telling the truth or exaggerating his/her symptoms (a 
dichotomous rating to allow for accuracy rates to be calculated).   They were also asked to rate 
on 7-point Likert scales: Credibility (1 = wholly truthful account to 7 = wholly untruthful 
account and 1 = wholly exaggerated to 7 = not at all exaggerated); confidence in their opinion 
(1 = very sure to 7 = not at all sure); and the difficulty of the task (1 = extremely difficult to 7 
= not at all difficult). 
  Those who had used the checklist were also asked; “Do you think the checklist helped 
you make a decision about the credibility of your interviewee?” (1 = very much so to 7 = not at 
all) and “Did the total score on your checklist reflect or contradict your instinct about the 
credibility of your interviewee?” (1 = complete agreement to 7 = complete contradiction). 
Results 
Checks on interviewee ratings 
  All interviewees were asked, after the cold plunge but before their interview, to 
complete the SF-MPQ once regarding their symptoms during the ice plunge and then again 
regarding their symptoms after the ice plunge.  They were asked to rate 15 symptoms (see 
above) in terms of their severity, on 4-point scales (0 = none, 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = 
severe).  Therefore scores could range from 0 to 45.  The higher the SF-MPQ score, the more 
overall discomfort a participant was feeling. A one-way MANOVA with status of interviewee 
(truth teller or malingerer) as the independent variable and total scores on the SF-MPQs for 




during and after the ice plunge were the dependent variables.   There was no significant 
difference between truth tellers (M = 26.56, SD = 6.19) and malingerers (M = 28.61, SD = 
8.99) for their SF-MPQ total for perceived discomfort during the ice plunge, F(1, 124) = 2.20, 
p = .14, d = .27. Furthermore, there was no significant difference between truth tellers (M = 
21.97, SD = 4.62) and malingerers (M = 22.06, SD = 5.39) for their SF-MPQ total for 
discomfort after the ice plunge, F(1,124) = .011, p = .92, d = .02. 
 After they had been interviewed the interviewees were asked to respond on 7-point 
Likert scales (1 = not at all to 7 = completely) questions about their experience of the 
interviews. They were asked: “To what extent do you think the interviewer believed your 
account?”; “To what extent did you have to think hard to convince the interviewer you were 
telling the truth?”; “To what extent did you try to control your body language during the 
interview?”; “To what extend did you have to control what you said during the interview?” and 
“How nervous did you feel during the interview?”. A 2 (truth teller or malingerer) x 2 
(interviewed with or without a checklist) MANOVA was conducted with the scores for these 
five questions as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate 
main effect for whether or not the interviewee was a truth teller or an exaggerator, Wilks’ λ = 
.61, F(5, 120) = 15.40, p < .001, eta
2
 = .97. Significant univariate effects for status of 
interviewee were also obtained: The malingerers indicated that they needed to think 
significantly harder (M = 4.50, SD = .21) than the truth tellers (M = 3.33, SD = .21 ), F (1,124) 
= 16.03, p < .001, eta
2
 =.11, d = 5.57; the malingerers indicated that they attempted to control 
their behaviour (M = 4.28, SD = .22) and the content of what they said (M = 5.14, SD = .20) 
significantly more than the truth tellers (M = 2.81, SD = .22 and M = 2.73, SD = .20, 
respectively), F(1,124) = 23.33, p < .001, eta
2
 = .16, d = 6.68 and F(1,124) = 75.68, p < .001, 
eta
2
 = .379, d = 12.05; and the malingerers indicated that they were significantly more nervous 
(M = 3.77, SD = .22) than the truth tellers (M = 2.77, SD = .22), F(1,124) = 10.39, p = .002, 
eta
2
 = .077, d =4.55. There was no significant difference between the truth tellers (M = 4.95, 
SD = .18) and the malingerers (M = 4.55, SD = .18) in terms of how much they felt they had 
been believed by their interviewers F(1, 124) = 2.51, p = .12, eta
2
 = .02, d = 2.22. 
At a multivariate level there was no significant main effect for whether or not the 
interviewee was interviewed with a checklist nor were there any univariate effects. There were 
no significant interaction effects.   
Checks on interviewer ratings 




  After each interview, all interviewers were asked to complete a questionnaire about the 
truthfulness of interviewees and their confidence in their judgements. A 2 (truthful or 
malingerer) x 2 (interviewed with or without checklist) MANOVA was conducted with the 
scores for these questions as the dependent variables.  The MANOVA revealed a significant 
multivariate main effect for truthfulness of interviewee, Wilks’ λ = .82, F(7, 118) = 3.80, p 
<.001, eta
2 
= .184. One significant univariate effect showed that the truth tellers were rated as 
significantly less likely to be exaggerating (M = 5.06, SD = 1.68) in comparison to those who 
were malingering (M = 3.74, SD = 1.81), F(1,124) = 18.61, p < .001, eta
2
 = .130, d = .76.  
There were no significant univariate effects for confidence ratings and no significant 
interaction effects.  There were no multivariate or univariate main effects for use of checklist 
and no significant interaction effects. 
  Those who had used the checklist were also asked; “Do you think the checklist helped 
you make a decision about the credibility of your interviewee?” (1 = very much so to 7 = not at 
all) and “Did the total score on your checklist reflect or contradict your instinct about the 
credibility of your interviewee?” (1 = complete agreement to 7 = complete contradiction).  A 
further one way MANOVA using only the data from those who used the checklist was 
conducted with the status of the interviewee (truth teller or malingerer) as the independent 
variable and the responses for these two questions as the dependent variables. No significant 
differences were found. With regard to ratings regarding the helpfulness of the checklist, for 
those who interviewed truth tellers the mean rating was 2.94 (SD = 1.39) and for those who 
interviewed malingerers the mean rating was 2.97 (SD = 1.46), p = .97.  With regard to ratings 
of whether the scores on the checklist agreed with instinct or not, for those who interviewed 
truth tellers the mean ratings was 3.28 (SD = 1.33) and for those who interviewed malingerers 
the mean rating was 3.47 (SD = 1.22), p = .56.   
Overall judgement accuracy 
To allow comparison of results with those of similar studies, judgement accuracy was 
computed. The evaluators who were not given the checklist to help them with their task 
achieved an overall hit rate of 58%, with 59% correct classification of truthful interviewees 
and 56% correct classification of those who were exaggerating their symptoms. A series of 
two-tailed binomial tests indicated that these evaluators did not classify their interviewees at a 
level significantly better than chance (50%).   




The evaluators who were given the checklist to help them with their task achieved an 
overall hit rate of 70% with 75% correct classification of truthful interviewees and 66% correct 
classification of those who were exaggerating their symptoms. A series of binomial tests 
indicated that these evaluators did classify their interviewees at a level significantly better than 
chance (p < 0.01). 
Signal detection analysis 
 Meissner and Kassin (2002) have suggested that Signal Detection Theory (SDT) can be 
used to analyse accuracy of credibility assessments. Using SDT, the performance of detectors 
can be assessed with “two conceptually and computationally independent parameters” (p.471). 
As such, the performance of our evaluators was calculated in terms of discrimination accuracy 
d’ and response bias B”D. Table 4 shows the total frequency of hits, misses, false alarms and 
correct rejections for interviewers with and without the checklist. A hit is a malingerer who is 
accurately classified as exaggerating symptoms; a miss is a malingerer who is labelled a truth 
teller; a false alarm is a truth teller who is labelled as exaggerating his/her symptoms; and a 
correct rejection is a truth teller who is accurately classified. To ascertain whether those with 
or without the checklist showed greater discrimination, d’ was calculated for both groups. This 
is a pure measure of sensitivity, it measures the signal and the noise means in standard 
deviation units. It corrects for response bias and guessing.  A value of 0 indicates evaluators 
showed an inability to distinguish exaggerators from truth tellers. Values above 0 indicate an 
ability to distinguish malingerers from truth tellers and negative values indicate response 
confusion. For those evaluators given the checklist d’ = 1.08 and for those without the 
checklist d’ = .39.  Two one-sample t-tests demonstrated that evaluators with the checklist 
discriminated malingerers from truth tellers significantly greater than a value of 0 (a score 
indicative of being unable to discriminate), t(31) = 2.881, p = .007; whereas evaluators without 
the checklist were not able to significantly discriminate malingerers from truth tellers, t(31) = 
1.000, p = .325.  An independent samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference 
between those with a checklist and those without in terms of overall discrimination, t(62) = -
2.34, p = .023. These data demonstrate that those with the checklist showed greater 
discriminability than those who did not receive it thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Finally, we calculated B”D as a measure of response bias (i.e. the tendency to respond 
‘truth’ or ‘exaggeration’).  A value of 1 means participants did not favour a particular 
response, >1 means participants showed a bias towards a truth judgement and <1 means that 




participants showed a bias towards a judgement that the interviewee was exaggerating. For 
those evaluators with no checklist B”D = 1.02 and for those with a checklist B”D = 1.16.  Two 
one-sample t-tests demonstrated that for those evaluators who did not use the checklist, 
response bias was not significantly greater than a value of 1 (p=.142) and nor was response 
bias significantly greater than a value of 1 for those who did use the checklist (p = .061).  
Discriminating objective truths from exaggeration 
To determine whether total checklist scores and scores for the individual items on the 
checklist were predictive of objective truth status, a discriminant analysis was conducted for 
the raters who had the checklist with actual truth status of interviewees as the dependent 
grouping variable and the total checklist scores and individual criteria scores as the predictor 
variables.  This yielded a significant discriminant function (Wilks’ λ = 0.64, X2 (11) = 25.14; p 
< .001) and an overall classification rate of 81% (78% for truthful interviewees and 84% for 
exaggerating interviewees).  
The discriminant analysis revealed that reporting improbable levels of severity of 
symptoms obtained the highest pooled within-group correlation (r = .58). The other checklist 
items found to discriminate significantly between truthful and exaggerated accounts were 
confirming the existence of many symptoms (r = .56), reporting symptoms that don’t readily 
fit those expected (r = .53), the interviewee reporting that the symptoms should only last a 
short time (r = .45), the interviewee reporting that someone else behaved recklessly (r = .45), 
the checklist total (r = .41), the interviewee reporting their own mental state (r = .39), reports 
of unusual details (r = .37), the individual blaming someone else (r = .36), and reports of 
unlikely or contradictory symptoms (r = .34) (see Table 5).  
With regard to the d scores, Cohen (1977) suggested that a d score of around .50 can be 
considered a medium effect and one around .80 can be considered a strong effect. Therefore, in 
the present study, it can be seen that at least the top three criteria in Table 5 show strong 
effects and the next seven show medium effects. As can be seen from Table 5 the significant 
criteria discriminated between truthful and exaggerated statements in the directions we would 
have predicted. That is, the total score was higher for exaggerated accounts than for truthful 
accounts thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Evaluators were more likely to indicate the presence of 
improbable levels of severity of symptoms, the existence of many symptoms, symptoms that 
don’t readily fit those expected, blaming someone else and suggesting that someone else 




behaved recklessly, and unlikely or contradictory symptoms significantly more for exaggerated 
accounts than truthful accounts. On the other hand, evaluators were more likely to indicate the 
presence of minimising the symptoms (saying they would last a short time or improve 
significantly), unusual details and accounts of mental state more often in truthful accounts than 
exaggerated accounts. These findings partially support Hypothesis 3, nine of the 28 criteria in 
the checklist significantly discriminated between truthful and exaggerated accounts in the 
predicted direction. 
Discriminating judgements 
A further discriminant analysis was conducted to determine whether total checklist 
scores and scores for the individual items on the checklist were predictive of the judgements 
that were made by the evaluators.  Judgements of ‘truthful’ and ‘exaggerated’ (regardless of 
actual credibility) were the dependent grouping variable and the total checklist scores and 
individual criteria scores were the predictor variables. This yielded a significant discriminant 
function (Wilks’ λ = 0.47, X2 (14) = 41.83; p < .001) and an overall classification rate of 83% 
(89% for truthful interviewees and 76% for exaggerating interviewees). The discriminant 
analysis revealed that reporting symptoms that don’t readily fit those expected obtained the 
highest pooled within-group correlation (r = .59). The other checklist items found to 
discriminate significantly between judgements of ‘truth’ or ‘exaggeration’ were reports of 
unusual details (r = .48), plausibility of answers (r = .48), reporting improbable levels of 
severity of symptoms (r = .46), reporting unlikely or contradictory symptoms (r = .45), the 
checklist total (r = .43), confirming the existence of many symptoms (r = .42), the interviewee 
reporting that someone else behaved recklessly (r = .36), the interviewee pausing for a long 
time between the end of a question and the beginning of the answer (r = .35), the interviewee 
giving clear answers (r = .30), the individual blaming someone else (r = .30), the interviewee  
reporting that the symptoms should only last a short time (r = .28) and the interviewee pausing 
for a long time when asked about symptoms compared to when asked about other things (r = 
.27) (see Table 6).  It can be seen that at least the top 8 criteria in Table 6 show strong effects 
and the next 5 show medium effects.  
As can be seen from Table 6, the significant criteria discriminated between judgements 
of truthful and exaggerated statements in the directions we would have predicted. Nine of the 
significant checklist items were the same as those highlighted in the discriminant analysis 
above. For the additional significant checklist items for this second analysis, plausible answers 




and long answers were rated as more present in the accounts that were judged as truthful 
compared to those that were judged as exaggerated (regardless of actual credibility). Long 
pauses in general and long pauses before answering questions (response latency) were all rated 
as more present in accounts rated as exaggerated compared to those rated as truthful. 
Discussion 
Interviewers were provided with a checklist drawn from the literature into lying and 
malingering, and were asked to indicate whether or not they believed their interviewees 
undergoing a cold pressor procedure were being truthful or exaggerating their physical and/or 
psychological symptoms.  Interviewers using the checklist achieved 75% correct classification 
of truthful interviewees and 66% correct classification of those who were exaggerating their 
symptoms. These data are similar to those reported when investigative interviewers are trained 
to use the CBCA and RM techniques for laboratory studies.  Success rates in these studies 
have ranged from 65% to 80% (Vrij, 2008).  Interviewers who were not given the checklist did 
not classify their interviewees at a level significantly better than chance (50%).  These findings 
are also similar to those found in previous studies in the context of investigative interviews. A 
meta-analysis of 206 studies showed an average hit rate of 54% for interviewers with no 
training in lie detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
Discriminant analysis yielded an overall classification rate of 81% (78% for truthful 
interviewees and 84% for exaggerating interviewees). Nine checklist items significantly 
discriminated between truth tellers and malingerers. Of these, three elicited strong effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d > 0.8) reporting improbable levels of severity of symptoms, confirming the 
existence of many symptoms and reporting symptoms that don’t readily fit those expected. 
Furthermore the total checklist score was significantly higher for exaggerated accounts than 
for truthful accounts.  These findings support the hypotheses and the proposal that it may be 
possible to improve the detection of lying or malingering in the medico-legal interview setting 
with provision of a checklist. 
The nine items that significantly discriminated between truth tellers and exaggerators 
were drawn mainly from the work of Rogers (1997) and Ferrari et al. (1999) with two from 
CBCA.   The two successful CBCA criteria in the current study were ‘accounts of own mental 
state’ and ‘inclusion of unusual or unexpected detail’.  It is somewhat surprising that ‘quantity 
of detail’ did not appear as a good predictor in this study as it has consistently been shown in 




previous research to be a reliable indicator with truth tellers giving significantly more detail 
than liars.  That said, Vrij (2008) suggests that it could be the quality of statements (e.g. 
inclusion of unusual detail, unexpected complications) that might better discriminate truth 
from fabrication.  Furthermore, the wording of the interview questions in our mock medico-
legal interview may not have prompted as much detail from interviewees as those questions 
used in investigative interviews thus limiting the possibility of a significant difference in 
amount of detail between truth tellers and malingerers.  The effect of type of interview 
question on elicitation of detail requires further investigation in the medico-legal setting.  It is 
not unusual that the motivation-related criteria of CBCA (e.g. ‘spontaneous corrections’, 
‘admitting lack of memory’ and ‘raising doubts about answers’) did not receive support.  This 
is often the case in laboratory based studies (Akehurst, et al., 2004; Gödert et al, 2005) as the 
stakes for interviewees are not as high as they would be in a real world setting. 
It is of interest to note that eight of the items and the checklist total score significantly 
discriminated between truths and lies and significantly discriminated between judgements of 
truth or lie. This would indicate that assessors considered these items to be helpful which 
appeared to assist in the objective differentiation of truth tellers and those exaggerating. 
However, there were four items which were considered to be of relevance by the assessors 
which were absent from the list that successfully discriminated between truths and lies. The 
items: Plausible answers, duration of answers, length of pauses, and response latency were 
judged by those undertaking the task to be valuable, but may actually have been irrelevant. The 
valuing of these questions by assessors in their deliberations may actually have been unhelpful. 
Further examination of this aspect would appear warranted in an endeavour to ensure both the 
efficient brevity of the checklist, and the avoidance of drawing assessor's attention to aspects 
that are associated with possible misinterpretation.  
Overall, therefore, these findings indicate that the literature on lying and deception 
developed in the forensic setting may be less relevant to the medico-legal assessor (with the 
exception of reports of unusual detail and the interviewee’s mental state which were taken 
from the CBCA technique). The items taken from the work of Rogers and Ferrari would 
appear to be more readily considered by the interviewer when reflecting upon an interaction 
and it may be that some of the items taken from CBCA and RM reflect the expected use of 
written transcripts and video-recorded interviews which would be rare in the medico-legal 
setting. This issue warrants further investigation. 




The nature of medico-legal assessments precludes the reliable evaluation of such a 
checklist in the field (i.e., with real claimants). Claimants cannot be expected to admit to 
deception before or after an interview while claims progress, and follow-up enquiries after 
settlement of claims would be unreliable and difficult for a number of reasons (e.g., when 
attempting to establish ground truth). The present study therefore sought to create a situation 
which offered an opportunity to explore various key aspects of the assessment of interviewees 
in a format which offers reasonable ecologically validity. There are, however, in this kind of 
research, unavoidable limitations as a result of the need to avoid causing participants 
unacceptable or lasting discomfort and distress. The motivation to maintain deception would 
be distinct in the medico-legal setting, although the motivation to be believed would be 
perhaps largely similar.  
 High rates of malingering have been estimated in various medico-legal settings. 
Ardolf, Denney and Houston (2007) suggested that the combined rate of probable and definite 
malingered neurocognitive dysfunction in a sample of criminal defendants was 54.3%. Greve, 
Bianchini and Curtis (2009) supported the proposal that the presence of external incentives can 
lead to high rates of exaggeration. However, in the broader medico-legal literature, estimates 
of malingered symptoms after personal injury have ranged from 1% to 50%, depending on 
whether rates are reported by psychiatric studies, insurance companies or plaintiffs’ legal 
representatives (Appelbaum et al., 1993).  The impact of base rates on the psychometric 
reliability of any measure in the applied setting warrants careful investigation.  In this 
laboratory study, the ratio of truth tellers to liars or exaggerators was controlled, although 
assessors had no basis on which to make predictions of relative frequencies. This aspect could 
be manipulated in future studies.  
This study explored the utility of a checklist drawn up by the authors based on their 
respective expertise and experience. There was therefore a degree of subjectivity in the choice 
of items, and some items required changes in wording and the addition of illustrations so as to 
be appropriate to the experimental setting. Further research will explore the views of other 
experts on the item selection, and review the process of selection where appropriate. In 
addition, further exploration of possible influence of illustrative examples needs to be 
undertaken. 
The specific focus of the present study should be noted. The current study did not test 
each of Resnick's (1995) types of malingering, rather focussing on partial malingering. In 




addition, the limitations imposed by the experimental procedure here used did not allow a full 
exploration of the potential impact of the factors identified by Resnick in an aide-memoire of 
the type envisaged. The indication that CBCA and RM criteria may not be as helpful in the 
detection of malingering warrants further investigation, and it may be the case that they would 
be more predictive in the detection of pure malingering or false imputation, than of partial 
malingering. Furthermore, both CBCA and RM are usually used to assess deception using 
transcript/video of an interview, and this may therefore explain their apparent limitations when 
used in the manner adopted here. It could also be that some items were easier to understand 
than others and that, with clearer definitions of the CBCA and RM criteria, interviewers may 
use them to better advantage. Thus it could be the case that training in CBCA would increase 
the utility of the CBCA related items for medico-legal experts, but such training in the absence 
of evidence of significant benefit may well be seen as too costly both in terms of time and 
financial outlay. The aide memoire envisaged here would most probably need to be freely 
accessible, readily understood and require no training if it were to be widely adopted among 
busy professionals in practice. 
 Participants were motivated to malinger in the study with a suggestion that if they 
convinced the interviewer of their credibility they might imagine being awarded compensation.  
However, this does not mirror the motivation of interviewees in a medico-legal setting in the 
real world.  Further exploration of the degree to which participants were motivated to 
exaggerate convincingly during their interviews is warranted, and the influence of higher 
degree of incentive to lie successfully in particular would be worthy of attention. In addition, 
experimental manipulation of high versus low stakes deception scenarios would be of interest, 
noting that such issues are of particular relevance in the context of the medico-legal setting.  
In the current study, both liars and truth tellers were instructed to "include lots of detail 
about your physical and psychological symptoms" and this may have reduced the effectiveness 
of certain checklist items relating to quantity and clarity of detail. In the real world it is 
unlikely that such an explicit instruction would be given to interviewees therefore instructions 
given pre-interview warrant further exploration.    
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5, 2013) proposes that malingering is 
strongly suspected if there is any combination of: a medicolegal context; discrepancy between 
the claim and the findings; lack of cooperation and antisocial personality disorder. The DSM-5 
definition of malingering refers to the false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological 




symptoms in the context of external incentives, and there are various other definitions that 
require the presence of an external incentive (Larrabee, 2007; Sweet et al., 2000). In this study, 
the external incentive could be seen as an aspect that could be manipulated more explicitly, 
and so future research might wish to explore the effect of increasing the incentives on 
performance of both those seeking to mislead and those endeavouring to detect exaggeration. 
Conclusion 
The current study indicates that further exploration of the use of a checklist by 
interviewers in the medico-legal setting is warranted. Refinement of the checklist in the 
laboratory setting would assist in development of a better understanding of the key features 
and processes of the use of such a device. Inter-rater reliability and test-re-test reliability can 
be assessed, and it would be preferable to explore the use of the device by expert witnesses in 
the laboratory setting. The use of such a checklist in the medico-legal assessment setting, were 
it to be shown to offer acceptable levels of reliability and validity in the laboratory setting, 
might be considered as relevant at various levels. In the first instance, it might be that just 
using the checklist could offer the Courts some reassurance that the expert assessor has 
considered more relevant (rather than potentially irrelevant) aspects of an interviewee’s 
presentation. It is possible that the numerical values produced from the scoring on the checklist 
could be used to offer some statistically derived indication of likelihood of truthfulness or 
deception, as well as some measure of confidence in the indications. However, we would be 
wary of any use of such a tool which encourages undue confidence in its validity or reliability 
in an interview. We do believe that these results suggest that the further examination of the 
process would be appropriate. Nevertheless, we note criticism of measures such as the 
Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms (Rogers et al., 1992; Rogers, Sewell & Gillard, 
2010) with regard to over-reliance in the court setting (DeClue, 2011), and again emphasise 
that the aim of the tool presented here in preliminary form is to draw the attention of assessors 
to potentially relevant issues rather than serve as some form of psychometric test. It may be the 
case that an aide memoire of the kind presented here in outline would be more widely adopted 
in settings where the more formal existing assessments of deception, are either considered to 
be impractical, given time constraints, or where experts do not feel that evidence for validity 
and reliability of devices currently available warrants their use in the medico-legal setting. 
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Appendix 1: The checklist items and their sources 
Item Item source 
1. If the individual pauses when describing symptoms, 
do the pauses last longer than when answering other 
questions? 
DePaulo et al. (2003) 
Vrij (2008) 
2. Does the individual show long latency periods i.e. the 
time between the end of a question and the beginning of 
an answer? 
DePaulo et al. (2003) 
Vrij (2008) 
3. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience talk in a 
disorganised way rather than speak in a structured and 
chronological order? 
CBCA criterion 2 
4. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience give substantial 
quantity of detail? 
CBCA criterion 3 
5. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, describe 
unusual detail and/or unexpected complications? 
CBCA criteria 7 and 8 
6. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, provide 
superfluous details (e.g. description of details which 
are not really relevant to answering the questions)? 
CBCA criterion 9 
7. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, use terms and 
language or show knowledge related to their 
symptoms that they would not be expected to have? 
CBCA criterion 10 
8. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, provide 
accounts of their own mental state? 
CBCA criterion 12 
9. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, provide 
CBCA criterion 14 





10. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, tend to admit 
to a lack of memory? 
CBCA criterion 15 
11. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, raise doubts 
about their own account? 
CBCA criterion 16 
12. Does the individual, when talking about the cold 
plunge test and subsequent experience, show self-
deprecation (i.e. put him or herself down)? 
CBCA criterion 17 
13. Does the individual show inappropriate behaviour? Validity Checklist item 2 
 
14. Does the individual give clear answers to questions 
about the symptoms? 
Reality Monitoring criterion 1 
15. Does the individual provide detail about physical 
sensations (e.g."It felt like pins and needles")? 
Reality Monitoring criterion 2 
16. Does the individual provide temporal details? (e.g. 
details about time order of the events; “the pins and 
needles came before the numb feeling") 
Reality Monitoring criterion 4 
17. Does the individual provide details about duration of 
events? ("the numbness lasted for about 10 minutes.") 
Reality Monitoring criterion 4 
18. Does the individual give plausible answers to the 
questions about the symptoms? 
Reality Monitoring criterion 7 
19. Does the individual show cognitive operations: 
inferences at the time of the event or at interview? (e.g. 
it appeared to me that she was enjoying me doing the ice 
plunge") 
Reality Monitoring criterion 8 
20. Is the individual falsely ascribing real symptoms to the 
cold plunge test (e.g. they had dry skin anyway and 
now blaming the cold plunge)? 
Resnick (1997) 




21. Does the individual show lack of co-operation at 
interview? 
Resnick (1997) 
22. Does the individual blame someone else for their 
symptoms?  
Ferrari et al. (1999) 
23. Does the individual believe that the other person 
behaved recklessly, so causing their discomfort? 
Ferrari et al. (1999) 
24. Does the individual expect their discomfort to last a 
short time and/or show significant improvement? 
Ferrari et al. (1999) 
25. Does the individual tend to confirm existence of many 
symptoms? 
Rogers (1997) 
26. Are there symptoms which do not readily fit those 
expected with a cold plunge test? 
Rogers (1997) 
Validity Checklist item 1 
27. Are there unlikely or contradictory patterns of 
symptoms? 
Rogers (1997) 
Validity Checklist item 1 
28. Are some symptoms reported as at extreme, 
improbable levels of severity? 
Rogers (1997) 
 
CBCA; Criteria Based Content Analysis criteria (from Steller & Köhnken, 1989). SVA; 
Validity Checklist Items (from Steller & Köhnken, 1989). RM; Reality Monitoring (from Vrij, 









Table 1: Criteria Based Content Analysis criteria (from Steller & Köhnken, 1989)  
CBCA Category CBCA Criteria Inclusion in 
Checklist for 
Current Study 




1.   Logical structure 
 
2.   Unstructured 
production 











4.   Contextual 
embedding 
5.   Descriptions of 
interactions 
6.   Reproduction of 
conversation 
7    Unexpected 
complications during 
the incident 
8.   Unusual details 





















Relates to the recall of an event, 
not symptoms. 
Relates to the recall of an event, 
not symptoms. 









Relates to the recall of an event, 
not symptoms. 




12. Accounts of 
subjective mental state 

















15. Admitting lack of 
memory 
16. Raising doubts 
about one's own 
testimony 
17. Self-deprecation 














19. Details specific to 
a type of crime 




















Inclusion in Checklist 
for Current Study 
Reason for Exclusion 
Psychological 
Characteristics 
1. Inappropriateness of 
language and 
knowledge 
2. Inappropriateness of 
behaviour 
















4. Suggestive, leading, 
or coercive questioning 
5. Overall inadequacy 




Not relevant in 
medico-legal setting. 





motives to report 
7. Questionable context 
of the original 
disclosure or report 






Not relevant in lab 
setting. 
 
Not relevant in lab 
setting. 




9.   Inconsistency with 
the laws of nature 







Not relevant in lab 
setting. 
Not relevant in lab 
setting. 
































Table 3: Reality Monitoring items (from Vrij, 2008).   
Reality Monitoring Criteria Inclusion in Checklist for 
Current Study 
Reason for Exclusion 




3. Spatial information X Relates to the recall of an 
event, not symptoms. 
4. Temporal information √  
5. Affect X Already included under 
(In)appropriateness of 
Behaviour – Validity 
Checklist item 2. 
6. Reconstructability of 
story 
X Relates to the recall of an 
event, not symptoms. 
7. Realism √  













Table 4. Frequency of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections for interviewers with 
and without the checklist 
 
 Hit  Miss False alarm Correct 
rejection 
Total 
With checklist 21 11 8 24 64 
Without checklist 18 14 13 19 64 


















Table 5. Means, univariate F-values, pooled within-group correlations between checklist items 
and canonical discriminant functions and Cohen’s d scores for difference between truthful and 














Are some symptoms reported as at 
improbable levels of severity? 
2.32 3.45 10.542 .582 0.83 
Does the individual tend to confirm 
the existence of many symptoms? 
3.19 4.13 10.391 .564 0.82 
Are there symptoms that do not 
readily fit those expected? 
1.84 2.81 10.007 .525 0.81 
^Does the individual expect his 
discomfort to last a short time or 
show a significant improvement? 
2.26 3.00 6.404 -.448 0.71 
Does the individual believe that 
someone else behaved recklessly? 
1.07 1.48 6.326 .445 0.64 
Checklist total 70.16 75.56 5.782 .407 0.61 
^Does the individual provide 
accounts of his own mental state? 
3.13 3.97 5.342 -.391 0.59 
^Does the individual include 
unusual or unexpected details? 
2.84 3.58 5.032 -.369 0.58 
Does the individual blame someone 
else? 
1.16 1.52 4.539 .359 0.58 
Are there unlikely or contradictory 
patterns of symptoms? 
1.74 2.39 4.515 .340 0.54 





* p < 0.05; ** p<0.01 
^ expected more often in truthful compared to exaggerated accounts so 1 = very much present 
and 5 = not at all present  
For all other items 1 = not at all present and 5 = very much present. In sum, a higher score 






















Table 6. Means, univariate F-values, pooled within-group correlations between checklist items 
and canonical discriminant functions and Cohen’s d scores for difference between judgements 














Are there symptoms that do not 
readily fit those expected? 
1.66 3.03 24.92 .594 1.25 
^Does the individual include 
unusual or unexpected details? 
2.59 3.83 16.50 .483 1.03 
^Does the individual give plausible 
answers to the questions about 
symptoms? 
1.77 2.69 16.46 .483 1.03 
Are some symptoms reported as at 
improbable levels of severity? 
2.31 3.59 14.65 .455 0.96 
Are there unlikely or contradictory 
patterns of symptoms? 
1.57 2.62 14.36 .451 0.95 
Checklist total 69.46 76.90 12.83 .426 0.91 
Does the individual tend to confirm 
the existence of many symptoms? 
3.14 4.17 12.65 .423 0.91 
Does the individual believe that 
someone else behaved recklessly? 
1.06 1.52 9.00 .357 0.83 
Does the individual wait a long time 
between the end of a question and 
the beginning of his answer? 
1.63 2.34 8.59 .349 0.73 
^Does the individual give clear 2.38 3.23 6.51 .303 0.65 




answers to questions about 
symptoms? 
Does the individual blame someone 
else? 
1.14 1.55 6.46 .302 0.65 
^Does the individual expect his 
discomfort to last a short time or 
show a significant improvement? 
2.31 3.00 5.67 .283 0.60 
Does the individual pause for longer 
during answers about symptoms 
compared to other answers? 
1.74 2.28 5.13 .269 0.57 
* p < 0.05; ** p<0.01 
^ expected more often in truthful compared to exaggerated accounts so 1 = very much present 
and 5 = not at all present  
For all other items 1 = not at all present and 5 = very much present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
